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Thanos Veremis
Greece, the Balkans
and the European Union
The Kosovo is very much in view now. One should say that Kosovo is
really a very old conflict, and many thought that Yugoslavia would have
disintegrated over the Kosovo issue, rather than Bosnia or Croatia.
Strangely enough, Kosovo did not erupt as some had predicted in 1989
and 1990, when Mr. Miloševiæ took away the Kosovo-Albanians auton-
omy, which they had enjoyed under the previous regime and especially
after the reform of the Yugoslavian constitution in 1974. At that time
Kosovo was given more autonomy than it had previously enjoyed, but an
autonomy short of complete independence as a constituent republic of
Yugoslavia. That was always the thorn in the side of the Albanian Koso-
vars: they wanted to be recognized as a full republic with the right to se-
cession. This is where the crunch lies, if you will. The full republics in
Yugoslavia also had the right to secession, whereas autonomous territo-
ries such as Vjoivodina and Kosovo did not have this right. So these ter-
ritories always hoped to upgrade their position from a mere territory to a
full republic. Instead, in 1989, after a series of turbulence and problems,
Miloševiæ –president of Serbia at that time – decided to take away their
autonomy, and revert Kosovo to a province of Serbia. The present state of
affairs is this: there are two parallel states in Kosovo, which do not com-
municate with each other. At least, the Albanian state does not want to
communicate with the Serbian state, because it would legitimize it if it
did: this is the line of argument that the Kosovar Albanians have. They
therefore would want to communicate with the state only through interna-
tional interlocutors. This is of course something that the Serbs do notThanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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want, because that would weaken their position and confer upon the Al-
banian Kosovars a kind of status of a semi-independent entity, which they
would never want to recognize. The Serbs, in other words, welcome a
bilateral meeting and agreement; the Albanians do not, because this would
legitimize the Serbs as a ruling authority. There are many other problems,
of course, beside this technical problem of the two meeting and discussing
the issues. Having said that, one should however note that in the summer
of 1996 Ibrahim Rugova, who is president of the Albanian community,
and Mr. Miloševiæ signed a document allowing the return of students to
secondary and higher educational institutions in Kosovo. This agreement
had facilitated the legitimate return of the student to their schools, the
schools provided by the state. The two sides had signed this agreement,
which implies that Miloševiæ had indirectly acknowledged Rugova’s
authority, and that Rugova had also acknowledged indirectly the authority
of Miloševiæ.  Nevertheless, this agreement has not as of yet been imple-
mented. It would certainly have been a wonderful confidence-building
measure if it had.
Now, things as they stand today are again entering a difficult phase. The
reason for that is this: Whereas Rugova’s policy had been one of non-
violence, a Ghandi-esque kind of policy vis-a-vis the Serbian authorities,
somewhere along the line a more activist and terroristic movement has
evolved, which in fact has been employing violence in promoting the
agenda of Kosovar independence. This, I think, is escalating the confron-
tation between Serbs and Kosovars, or between the official state and the
Albanian community. I should also point out that the Western position
vis-avis the pleas of independence of the Albanian Kosovars has been a
negative one. In other words: the West has not encouraged independence
because that would mean changing the map of the region, creating a new
state. But the West has encouraged a new concept of autonomy. The Al-
banian Kosovars dislike the term “autonomy”; if you use it in their pres-
ence, they react in a very negative way. I did commit this impropriety at
one point and they gasped and said: “Autonomy? Don’t ever use this
word again.” Instead they prefer other terms, such as “special regime” orThanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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other diplomatic ways of going around the use of the term autonomy.
This word has been tinted by Miloševiæ’s withdrawal of that which had
been theirs before 1989. So they argue: „What is the point of returning to
an autonomy which the Serbs can always take away, thereby reducing us
to the present state of affairs?“ The Serb authorities refuse to discuss in-
dependence but they will discuss autonomy. They say: „They already
have autonomy, but they don’t use it. Look at them, the Serbian authori-
ties say, they won’t even take part in the national elections; if they did,
they would find out that they would have a sizable representation in par-
liament.“ In fact, if they do take part in elections fifteen years from now
they may find that they have a majority in the parliament of the federal
government of Yugoslavia, or whatever it might be called then. The rea-
son for this is that the birth rate among the Albanian population is very
high as opposed to that of the Serbs, which is very low. Given the present
birth rate I think they may find it opportune in the future, if the problem
is still as it is today and no conflagration has occurred, they may decide to
enter elections and use the parliamentary venue for controlling their fate.
Then the Serbs will be in a very difficult position. But, so far, they have
not; they have abstained from elections.
The present situation is not at all a desirable state of affairs, because the
two communities live separately and may cause a chain reaction of prob-
lems in the region. One of the problems, of course, is implicating in this
conflict the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which
has a sizable Albanian minority that is craving for the status of a constitu-
ent community in the state of FYROM. Now: Why will the Kosovo
problem trickle into Skopje? Mainly because the leading elite of the Alba-
nians of that state have in fact been educated and bred in Pristina in the
days when the University of Pristina was within an autonomous state and
the two populations could move back and forth because they were part of
the same federation. Since FYROM became an independent state, the
movement of people between Skopje and Pristina has become much more
difficult. The attempt of the Albanian Macedonians to set up a university
was frustrated by the state and was not allowed to take place. So the Al-Thanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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banian Macedonians have serious qualms. This could lead to more trou-
ble, should Kosovo erupt. There is also the other angle of the triangle
between Pristina, Skopje (or Tetovo, if you like) and Tirana: that is Alba-
nia. Albania could have acted as a catalyst for an uprising, if Mr. Berisha
were still in power. Mr. Berisha was president of Albania and used to be
very supportive of the Albanian Kosovars in the past. There came a point
when he became less supportive and he fell out of grace with Rugova.
The two were not on very good terms toward the end of Berisha’s presi-
dency. But the present Prime Minister of Albania, Mr. Fatos Nono, is
even less willing to go out of his way to support an uprising in Kosovo.
For what reason? Mainly because he has too many troubles of his own at
home, especially after the collapse of the pyramids and the uprisings,
shootings and the problems which ensued thereafter; he is also trying to
put his economy in order; and trying to establish contacts with the West;
he is craving for Western financial assistance. Therefore, a problem of
this magnitude in his backyard which would drive refugees into Albania,
is the last thing he would like to see. I think he is discouraging activism
on the part of his Albanian compatriots on the other side of the frontier.
However, nothing is set or predetermined in history. Things occur when
we least expect them to occur. As I said, one expected a conflagration
between the early 90’s and 1997, nothing or at least very little happened
in spite of prognostications. It may happen now, when things appear to be
quiet in the rest of Yugoslavia.
This brings me to the other side of the problem with Kosovo, which is
Bosnia. What happens in Kosovo in a way depends what will happen in
Bosnia. Why? Because Bosnia will act as a paradigm, as an example for
Kosovo. It already has. I think the first lesson of the Dayton Agreement
for the Albanian Kosovars has been a negative lesson. The insurgents in
Bosnia were recognized as parlaying parties at the negotiation table at
Dayton, and each got his own piece of the pie. However, there was
nothing in the Dayton Agreement concerning the Albanians in Kosovo,
who kept their peace and did nothing – in both cases, they got very little
for behaving, as opposed to the others, who got something for their mis-Thanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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conduct. So that was the first negative lesson for the Albanian Kosovars
from the Dayton Peace Accord. They are very much waiting to see what
will come out of Dayton today. Given the state of affairs of today, noth-
ing much can come out of Dayton, except the maintenance of the status
quo, which is not an easy task, anyway. But nothing radical appears to be
happening or will happen in the near future, especially if the SFOR re-
tains its positions in Bosnia – i.e., if the Americans do not withdraw their
forces, because the SFOR is really based on the American presence. (The
Europeans have stated their lack of willingness to remain, if the Ameri-
cans should decide to leave.) If the SFOR remains – my guess is that it
probably will, for a while – things will not change radically. But there are
three possibilities in Bosnia. One, is this state of loose confederation,
which we have. Another is dismemberment, which may occur if the
SFOR leaves and there is fighting again. Finally, the American dream
would be to bring Bosnia together again, like Humpty-Dumpty, but a kind
of multi-ethnic Humpty-Dumpty: a loose confederation of different ethnic
groups that could move freely and re-establish themselves in the region of
their preference. It sounds a bit optimistic, but it is another possible
agenda for Bosnia. If partition occurs, the Kosovar Albanians will cer-
tainly take this as an indication of what they ought to do. So: there is an-
other problem in the region: Bosnia as a possible model for the future of
the Kosovar Albanians. Of course, having said all this, one may witness
violence without such developments, because violence tends to breed on
itself. If the Serbs decide to quell the demonstrations of the students and
the young people in the streets of Pristina – frankly, there are more young
people in Pristina then I have ever seen anywhere else (the average age
must be below twenty: a very young population, vigorous and ready to
act) if the Serbs put down these demonstrations with violence, this may
lead to more violence and maybe even to a full-scale confrontation.
It is interesting to witness this development at the time when things are
also happening in Serbia itself. To what extent they are progressing, it is
very difficult to say, but Serbia has a new president, Mr. Milotinovich,
who was very much Mr. Miloševiæ’s man: he was Foreign Minister ofThanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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Yugoslavia and very loyal to Miloševiæ. But, he has more power now,
institutionally speaking, than Miloševiæ has. Assuming he wants to leave
his mark on history and emancipate himself from Mr. Miloševiæ’s influ-
ence, he could easily do it by acting in a much more liberal way than his
predecessor and by opening up to the rest of the world. Frankly, the in-
centives are there. I think there are a series of openings which the United
States and the European Union have made possible: a partial lifting of the
existing embargoes to give the Serbs the message that Europe and United
States are willing to go a long way, if Miloševiæ observes the rules of the
game. Given the fact that Mr. Dodik was elected Prime Minister of the
Republic Serbska – Dodik, who has exhibited some of his good intentions
lately by promising to uphold the provisions of the Dayton Agreement and
to also help the SFOR forces bring some of the war criminals to the jus-
tice of the United Nations. So there are indications of movement, Mr.
Karadjic notwithstanding, there is some improvement in the relations of
the state of Serbia with the Republic of Serbska. This is not to say that
they are one and the same, but there are very strong connections, no
doubt. Much, therefore, will depend on the behavior of the state of Yugo-
slavia in the future. As I said, Mr. Milutonivitch is not a known quantity.
We have known him as Miloševiæ’s man in the past. We also know that
the opposition to Miloševiæ has not won its spurs in liberal and demo-
cratic politics. Neither Mr. Gingich nor Mr. Draskovitch are the best ex-
amples of parliamentary and liberal democracy. Alas, this is one of the
problems which bedevil Serbian politics: the lack of a credible opposition
with a vision and a future. Instead, you have a old-time communist or na-
tionalist entering the opposition against Miloševiæ.
Given all that, it is very difficult to be optimistic that politics will change
drastically in Yugoslavia. But the element of surprise has always been a
thing of history. So we will just hope and wait, hope that the quelling of
these demonstrations will not become so violent as to preempt further
demonstrations. I don’t think the Albanian Kosovars are willing to go a
long way right now because their own elections are pending. They would
rather have a legitimate government backed by popular vote before goingThanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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in any direction. Rugova is opposed to violence, anyway – that has al-
ways been his hallmark. And I don’t think that there is any really strong
feeling on the part of Demacik either for a confrontation of this nature.
The question that remains in the region is Albanian irredentism in gen-
eral. Kosovo is one thing; then there is Tetovo and Skopje, with sizable
Albanian populations. There’s Albania itself, which is now undergoing a
very difficult period of re-adjusting and reforming its economy and re-
forming its political system in general. Albania is the Rip van Winkle of
the Balkans: a state that fell asleep fifty years ago and woke up when the
world was totally changed. Everything had changed around it and it had
to catch up after so many years of the most insular Communist regime in
the world. For those who have not seen a very interesting film, I do rec-
ommend you see it: an Italian film called “L’America”. It’s about Alba-
nia waking up after all those years of the Hoja- regime. It’s a film of the
early 90’s. “L’America” – an Italian film: wonderful, to the point. Not a
documentary, but a documentary in fact – it does give you a view of what
Albania was, and still is, to a great extent. So, what I think we are wit-
nessing is a postponement of the Albanian question. What happens with
all these three elements of Albania: Albania proper, and Kosovo, which is
in fact the cradle of modern Albanian nationalism: this is where the Alba-
nians gained a new secular, national identity. And of course the upcoming
Albanian element in FYROM, which is both growing in numbers and in
financial capability: they have a huge diaspora which is investing in the
state; they are hard-working; they have tremendous drive. As I said, this
threesome, the three sides of this triangle will certainly be in the news in
the future.
Greece in the 70’s and 80’s was in the vanguard of a multilateral Balkan
get-together. Greece championed multilateralism, especially during the
Communist era and after 1974 when Greece emerged out of its own dic-
tatorship. Mr. Karamanlis, the first Prime Minister after 1974, embarked
in getting the Balkan states together in a kind of multilateral activity.
Then, later on, Mr. Papandrejou continued this tradition of Balkan multi-Thanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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lateralism even more vigorously when he became Prime Minister. In spite
of a lack of enthusiasm on the part of Bulgaria – Bulgaria was the closest
to the Soviet Union’s foreign policy position -, the not-too-enthusiastic
position of Yugoslavia in those days , and the very enthusiastic position of
Rumania – Rumania was always very keen on multilateralism in the Bal-
kans – in spite of all these things, I think there was movement in the di-
rection of multilateral co-operation. Even the term “federation” was res-
urrected from the pre-war period (1934). The collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion, instead of allowing Greece to play this role at last – a role she had
cultivated for so many years – brought about a rather unexpected turn of
events. Nationalism flourished, not only in Greece but in all the countries
of the region, and fed upon the nationalism of each neighbor. Unfortu-
nately, nationalisms cause incompatibility: when one state is nationalistic,
the other tends to react in the same way. It is a contagion that works in a
very negative way, and this contagion did affect Greece negatively. Its
foreign policy was a policy of lost opportunities, as some people say in
Greece. Fortunately, it’s never too late. I think things began to change
especially since 1995, with the interim agreement between FYROM and
Greece. In the summer of 1995, in which the state agreed to give up its
national symbol, which was a misconceived symbol anyway – they had
taken up the sun of the Macedonian dynasty, which was in fact first dis-
covered by the public in the late 70’s. It was an archeological find in
Greece which brought this sun of the Macedonian dynasty to the fore and
made it prominent, and then at some point the state of FYROM took it
over as their national insignia. This of course made the Greeks livid and
created all kinds of problems. So: in 1995 the flag was given up, and a
new flag appeared in its place. Greece lifted its embargo and relations
proceeded smoothly since. Trade between the two states is very good
now, and there is much Greek investment in FYROM. Relations between
Greece and Albania were also very problematic between 1992/93 and
1996/97. There were all kinds of problems. But: things are looking up
and have, in fact, improved markedly thanks to the good services of the
United States: specifically, thanks to Mr. Shifter, who acted as a go-Thanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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between in 1995, when relations were blocked. Today they are on the
good side, especially since the breakdown of authority in Albania. There
was an OSCE presence there, and I think that the Western European Un-
ion missed a wonderful opportunity to play a particular role. Greece also
participated and did a good job in its own stead. So: relations are good
with Albania; they are OK with FYROM; they have been relatively good
with Bulgaria since the late 70’s and continue – with ups and downs – to
be on the good side. Relations with Rumania were always good and
pleasant; we never had problems with Rumania.
On the whole, relations are improving in the Balkan region; businessmen
are belatedly discovering the opportunities they lost due to the problems
between Greece and FYROM and Greece and Albania. Greece, again,
has taken the initiative to play a stabilizing role in the region. It is the re-
cipient of a huge number of economic refugees, mainly from Albania but
also from the other states of the region. That in itself is a kind of stabi-
lizing contribution, because obviously the Albanians also provide for their
families in the home country. We have about 300,000 Albanians; if one
multiplies that by five or six dependents, you have half of the population
of Albania subsisting on the remittances of the illegal and legal Albanian
workers in Greece. That is one positive contribution – but there are oth-
ers, which are in fact not charity but business. Business has a longevity
which charity does not. We have such a prospect in Albania and things
will be looking better there as soon as the state is back in order. And this
is also true for the rest of the Balkans. Of course, the Balkans are under-
going a period of anomie or, to use a muccholarly term used by the press:
kleptocracy. A kind of wild west situation with a lack of law enforce-
ment; mafias; strong men; family connections. In other words, we are
witnessing a period at the eve of the market economy, so to speak. Hope-
fully this will develop into a market system such as the one we know. If it
does, the Balkans will catch up and become lands of opportunity in the
next decades. My feeling is that they will. To tell you the truth, I too dis-
covered the Balkans belatedly in my life. But I discovered the Balkans in
the late 80’s and have found out that they are no different in their aspira-Thanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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tions to develop than any other place in the world. I should also say that
they have been maligned by the press, and not just the recent press. I
think they are the traditional scapegoats of the European mass media.
They have been presented as the place where all kinds of odd and bar-
baric things occur, as if there were a congenital barbarity in the Balkan
people. Of course all of this is nonsense. Let’s face it: the rest of Europe
did not do too well in the 20
th Century.
One cannot malign the Balkans without placing them in historical per-
spective. I was very disappointed with  the eminent George Kennan’s in-
troduction to the book which the Carnegie Endowment for Peace chose to
re-publish in 1993, The Other Balkan War. This presents the findings of
research during the Balkan wars, 1912-13, on the atrocities committed by
the belligerents, enumerated (and rightly so) and published in 1914. (The
year of World War One, by the way.) What is strange is that this book
was re-printed in 1993 with an introduction by George Kennan, who said
more or less that 80 years have passed since the first publication of this
book, and there is no reason to believe that the Balkan people have given
up their bad ways or stopped fighting against each other. That is abso-
lutely wrong, because the demise or destruction of Yugoslavia has noth-
ing to do with inter-state wars, which occurred in 1912-13. In fact, there
was no war between any two Balkan states in the past 50 or 60 years. The
Balkan states were remarkably peaceful toward one another, and have
achieved their transition from the communist regime to the present state
of affairs with a minimum of bloodshed. Granted, the economies are in
shambles. But parliamentary democracy works. The economic field is a
different matter. The free market is not working yet as it ought to, neither
in Bulgaria nor in Albania. Slowly, Rumania is making good progress,
especially with the new government. But, one can say very little about
displays of aggression between the states in the Balkans. This particular
misperception of the Balkans that a person of the stature of George Ken-
nan displays, is standard for Westerners who want to learn about the Bal-
kans. Instead of picking up a good book like Susan Woodward’s, theyThanos Veremis – Greece, the Balkans and the European Union
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read Kaplan’s sensational journalism and are immediately convinced that
this is a region of congenital barbarism and that nothing can go right.
I object to that; I think much can and will improve, although there are
flash points and problems. Kosovo is particularly important. If we man-
age to put it on the right track, I think things will improve. Not only be-
cause of Kosovo in Serbia, but because Kosovo is the tip of the triangle
between the two neighboring states, FYROM and Albania.ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-933307-09-0
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